Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
ARASBARAN
commoner tribes joined the retinues of noble chiefs, on whom they probably depended at this time for access to pasture. By 1843 the Mishkin tribes were said to number 6-7,000 families and to be more prosperous and powerful, while the Ardabil tribes numbered 5,000 and were increasingly settled. But this formal hierarchy of groups and authority was breaking down, and a new structure was emerging, partly as a result of internal contradictions and partly in response to a series of drastic changes in the economic and political environment, beginning with the Russian advent in Mughan. With Persia being steadily strangled by British and Russian imperial interests, most insidiously by their overt economic penetration of the country, the Shahsevan as frontier tribes suffered not only from the restriction of their grazing lands but also from the increasing extortions of the Qajar administration. Not surprisingly they responded by raiding, confined at first to the Russian colonies along and beyond the Kur river. As these depredations spread further afield during the second half of the nineteenth century, they became a festering issue between the Russian and Persian authorities. The latter attempted to restrain the Shahsevan through the elbegis, but the Ardabil branch of the dynasty was now already assimilated to the administration and to urban life, and had lost touch with the tribes, while the Mishkin elbegis either could not or would not control the most recalcitrant brigands, and were unacceptable to the Russians. The noble tribes meanwhile were weakened through rivalries within the chiefly lineages.
The break-up of the descent-based hierarchy and unity of the confederations had accelerated after 1850, when chiefs of individual tribes seized control of the pastures allocated to them in Russian Mughan. Where they had formerly depended on delegated authority, now they had important economic powers too. One noble tribe in each branch continued to dominate the rest: Qojabeglu in Mishkin and Polatlu in Ardabil. The larger and wealthier commoner tribes now declared their independence of the nobles and began to collect their own followings of weaker tribes. Weaker commoner (and noble) chiefs, if only to secure their control of their own tribes, sought the support of a dominant tribe. A new stratification, based not on descent but on wealth and manpower, now formed.
With the Persian authorities unable or unwilling to exercise more than intermittent control on their frontier, in 1884 the Russians took the planned but inevitable step of closing it to the Shahsevan'nomads. The result was economic, social and political upheaval in north-east Azarbayjan. More than two-thirds of the nomads were deprived of their traditional winter pastures and markets, and though efforts were made to find them new ones on the Persian side of the frontier, inter-tribal disputes grew violent and raiding proliferated. For forty years the Shahsevan were in almost continual rebellion against all external authority.
By 1900 the chiefs of seven Shahsevan tribes (Hajjikhojalu, Geyiklu, Qojabeglu and its rival offshoot 'Isabeglu, Alarlu, Polatlu and Yortchi) had emerged as the most effective leaders. They divided the pastures and village lands of the region between them and sent their armed retinues to raid widely in neighbouring regions of Russia and Persia. A common feature of these tribes, the main basis of their chiefs' power, was that before the closure of Russian Mughan they all had either extensive village bases, or pasture in Persian Mughan, or both. Thus, Polatlu and Yortchi were almost wholly settled near Ardabil. Hajjikhojalu and Geyiklu, neighbours in both winter and summer quarters, had fine pastures in the western part of the region, comparatively inaccessible both to the Russians and to the Persian authorities. Qojabeglu and 'Isabeglu, occupying the centre of the region, were between them able to control both the access of other tribes to Mughan and the passing of trade caravans between the towns of Ahar, Ardabil and Belasuvar. Alarlu, mainly settled with prosperous farmlands near Garmi, dominated Ujarud and the frontier between there and Ardabil. On one or two notable occasions most of these tribes were allied for a particular common purpose, but usually each was on terms of hostility if not blood-feud with its neighbours, and formed alliances among the others and with tribes in neighbouring regions: the Chalabianlu and HaIjji'alilu of Qaradagh, the Shatranlu of Khalkhal, the Dalikanlu of Sarab, the Galish of Talish.
The chiefs of the former noble tribes Qojabeglu (and 'Isabeglu) and Polatlu maintained a degree of moral authority and continued to wield symbols of nobility and to rule their followers through a hierarchy of subordinate chiefs and elders. The four leading commoner tribes (IHajjikhojalu, Yortchi, Alarlu, Geyiklu) attempted to establish the same kind of dynastic rule and hierarchical structure of their following as had characterized the former noble tribes. Each dominant tribe had its chiefly lineage and its commoners, and so did each subordinate tribe. The hierarchy of each 'tribal cluster' now developed as follows:
The begzadd included the chief of the dominant tribe and his suite, comprising his agnates and their households, who between them owned or controlled access to much of the available pasture and farmland, and a few personal servants (scribes, tutors), who might be of the chiefly lineage or refugees of rank from elsewhere; and also the chiefs of subordinate tribes in the cluster and their (much smaller) suites. The begzadd provided military levies for the government when called on. 4 Each chief had a retinue of servants (nokdr), including the mounted riflemen provided by elders of commoner communities of the tribe, who would be detailed for domestic military duties (defence of the chief's property and camp, raids, coercion of dissident followers); it also included the chief's menial servants and herdsmen, mostly outlaws, or refugee peasants or nomads without property or effective kin support of their own.
The commoners (raydt, hampa) were the mass of non-chiefly pastoral nomads, who usually had nominal rights to their pastures (particularly after 1884) and were economically independent, but were required to provide a number of mounted riflemen to serv'e in the chief's retinue.
This structure was not effectively centralized. The main threat to the cluster Talishmika'illu  40  Takileh  25  Geyiklu  30  Alarlu of Langan  50  Husaynhajjilu  15  Damirchilu  15  Ajirlu 10 Each year those who had served the previous year were replaced, and then had to serve again the following year, so in fact some 880 horsemen of the Shahsevan were regularly involved (Tigranov, 1909: 121, 144 ). chief's domination came from the more powerful of his close agnates, especially half-brothers or close cousins who owned and lived in lands at some distance from his own. They too maintained suites of armed henchmen and retinues of servants and herdsmen; the henchmen were locally recruited and owed their immediate loyalty to the leader who could best ensure the protection of their vulnerable pastoral resources. The cluster chief could not hope to crush these rivals, nor to deprive them of their property, and in fact relied on them to keep outlying subordinate chiefs and elders in order-these were discouraged if not actually prevented from accumulating wealth, and chiefs of smaller and weaker tribes were little more than primus inter pares among their elders. So long as the cluster chief supplied his agnates with sufficient spoils and armed reinforcements when necessary, he could rely on their support; otherwise rivalries threatened to split the chiefly dynasty, as they had the former noble tribes. Dynastic disputes did develop in each of the dominant tribes, the opposition in each case forming around close agnates of the cluster chief. The names of the chiefs involved in the events narrated below are often more significant than the names of their tribes.5
The Shahsevan up to the Constitutional Revolution During the years of Muhammad 'All Mirza's rule as heir apparent (1896-1907), the province of Azarbayjan was in continual disorder and distress. The administrative machinery broke down; agitation by xenophobic reformist elements in the mercantile and religious classes increased following their victory over the Tobacco Concession, and now Russia, though having contributed to that victory, became the sole target of opposition. Muhammad 'Ali identified himself with everything Russian, and his subservience to Russian influence was a major factor in his eventual downfall as Shah. Meanwhile he relied, though with little effect, on brigands like Rahim Khan Chalabianlu of Qaradagh to control his disordered province.
The Ardabil region was in turmoil. There were repeated grain shortages, due not only to bad harvests and the insecurity of cultivation but also to hoarding and speculation by the landowners. These included the religious leaders who, while pursuing their own active and often violent Ni'mati-Haydari rivalries, incited the city populace against foreigners and against the Governors, several of whom were forced to take refuge. Meanwhile the Shahsevan tribes raided throughout the region and in the city itself. On a number of occasions Muhammad 'All sent Rahim Khan to help quell disturbances in the city or to subdue the tribes. In 1901 two major expeditions against the Shahsevan had some short-lived success: in March the Governor of Ardabil, Samad Khan Shuja'alDauleh,6 helped by Rahim Khan, arrested the following chiefs: Hazrat Quli of Hajjikhojalu, Muhammad Qull Khan of Alarlu, Sardar Beg of Qojabeglu, and Qara Beg Dilaqarda; but these came to some arrangement with their captors, and were apparently released. For whatever reason, in spite of this success, Samad Khan was dismissed. His replacement as Governor, Imam Quli Mirza, refused to leave Tabriz without an adequate force, and since many of the landowners suffering from Shahsevan depredations were prominent Tabriz! citizens, he was duly supplied with several thousand troops. With the aid of the Governor of Qaradagh, he had by late summer subdued all the tribes, 5 Detailed descriptions of the tribes at this time and the effects of the frontier closure on them can be found in Tapper (1972: 590-613 Throughout these years, the Caucasian administration and the Russian representatives at Tabriz apparently encouraged the Shahsevan, supplying them with arms, allowing them to take refuge over the frontier when pursued, and intervening on their behalf when they were captured. Meanwhile they built up their Cossack forces at frontier points like Astara and Khuda Afarin, offering their services to the Persian government, which was able to refuse them only by sending expeditions such as that of Imam Quli Mirza in 1901. In addition, the Russians took their own reprisals against those of the tribes (notably Qojabeglu and Alarlu) which raided too flagrantly over the frontier. Their policy was clearly to foster disorder within Persian territory and to make their own military assistance and eventual occupation indispensable, though they did not achieve this for some years.
Russian military expeditions visited Shahsevan districts for intelligence purposes.8 Russian merchants and goods dominated the trade of Azarbayjan, and, after Tabriz, Ardabil was the most important commercial centre of the province. Russian subjects were buying numerous villages in the province, though they had to use Persian proxies in order to overcome legal restrictions. New roads and railways across the province were planned, though a proposed railway south from Aslanduz was rejected as it would run through banditinfested country.
The tribes of north-east Azarbayjan played no significant role in the first two years of the Constitutional Revolution. However, when B6yiuk Khan Chalabianlfu, at the instigation of his father Rahim Khan (who was in Tehran), attempted to end the Tabriz anjuman in May 1907, his march on Tabriz was halted by the pillaging of his villages in Qaradagh in his absence by the Hajjikhojalu tribe; but the latter's action was probably more due to their longstanding enmity with the Chalabianlu than to the support for the Constitution which they were later to show.9 Pokhitonov, Russian Consul-General at Tabriz, magnified every such instance of disorder in his appeals for the introduction of Russian troops to 'keep the peace '. Rahim Khan's rival, Karim Khan, was sent by the Constitutionalists to be chief of Chalabianlu, promising to capture Boyiik Khan, but though he quietened Qaradagh, he failed in his avowed object.
The populace of Ardabil had eagerly welcomed the turn of events in late 1906. They pressed for the removal of the reactionary Governor Sa'd al-Mulk, and on instructions from Tabriz, the leading Ni'mati mujtahid, Mirza 'All Akbar, set up a local anjuman. The Haydari, however, set up a rival anjuman, and hostilities between the factions intensified, until the introduction of bands of Shahsevan warriors, Qojabeglu by the Ni'mati and Polatlu by the Haydari, brought violence and death to the streets. Naqi Khan Rashid al-Mulk,10 a presumed supporter of the Constitution but later to become known as a Russophile, had been sent from Tabriz to be Governor; he suppressed the rival anjumans and initiated a new one with equal numbers from each faction; but 7 On the events of 1901 see Tigranov (1909: 14-44 The Belasuvdr affair Some years previously, Shahsevan tribes migrating to and from the eastern part of Mughan had been given permission to use a track crossing Russian territory in the vicinity of Deman. Muh.ammad Qull Khan of Alarlu constructed a small settlement beside the track; the Russian authorities, alleging that he based raiding expeditions on this settlement, which they thus interpreted as a fort, demanded that he dismantle it; as he paid no attention, a Cossack detachment was detailed to patrol the frontier between Deman and Belasuvar. On 11 April 1908 an officer of this detachment crossed onto Persian territory near Belasuvar in pursuit of a runaway horse. On encountering a party of Qojabeglu tribesmen he was shot dead and several of his escort were wounded. In immediate retaliation the Cossack garrison at Belasuvar crossed to the Persian side of the frontier, destroyed the customs post and killed some forty inhabitants. A week or so later, reinforcements arrived from Baku, and a force of several hundred men assembled and divided into two parties. The first, having entered Persia near Belasuvar and destroyed one or two Persian villages, set off in pursuit of the Qojabeglu, but after suffering heavily in an engagement with the tribesmen, the party had to withdraw. The second party, under General Snarskiy, destroyed Muhammad Quli's settlement near Deman, then crossed the frontier and razed other Persian villages to the ground before withdrawing. On 16 May Snarskiy, who was later to become notorious for his excesses during the occupation of Tabriz, gave the Persian authorities an ultimatum to the effect that if certain demands were not fulfilled, he would enter Persia again and see to their satisfaction himself. The demands included tlhe handing over of the officer's killers, the return of stolen property, guarantees against further raiding by the tribesmen, and the payment of 80,000 roubles, a sum which the Persians were most unlikely to be able to find. Now the Qojabeglu had only too often in recent years raided Russian border posts for arms, and Russian villages for other loot, but on this occasion not only had the original Cossack party been trespassing but the officer had fired first and was in other ways to blame for his own fate (some years before, he had killed two sons of a Qojabeglu chief, and though subsequently offered a transfer so as to avoid vengeance, he had refused). Moreover, the retaliations were brutal and unjustifiable. The Russian envoy in Tehran, somewhat embarrassed by these excesses, admitted the officer's trespass to his British colleague, but the Caucasian administration disguised what had really happened, refused to allow a Joint Commission of Enquiry, blew the incident up to major proportions and publicized Snarskiy's expedition as a legitimate measure taken in exasperation against bandits, of whose continual atrocities against Russian frontier guards this had been merely the latest and worst example.
The Persian government took serious steps to satisfy some of the demands. Much of the looted property of the Ardabilis had been recovered and was restored to its owners, but Yeprem and the Bakhtlari were said to have brought great loads of cash and booty with them back to Tehran. The Shahsevan chiefs declared that they had been tricked into submission, that pledges made to them had not been honoured, and that they intended to hold an enquiry into the conduct of the expedition. Actually, As expected, the Shahsevan chiefs, who had returned in the winter eager for revenge, commenced looting on a wide scale in spring 1912. In April the first encounter took place between Fidarov's troops and Shahsevan tribesmen, in Khalkhal. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Fidarov delayed his movement against the tribes; he probably felt his force insufficient and was waiting both for provocation by the tribesmen so that he could call for reinforcements, and for a Persian force to be sent and to be shown inadequate. Then early in June a party of Cossacks left Ardabil for summer quarters nearby, and the Qojabeglu duly attacked them, thinking them a punitive expedition; Fidarov then sent a real punitive force against them, and there was some fighting in Mishkin and further heavy losses on both sides. Strong reinforcements were brought to the region from Tabriz, Qarabagh and Astara; at Russian request, a Persian force of 1,000 men was sent, once more under their ever-willing servant Rashid al-Mulk, but having suffered the expected defeat, the remnants did not reach Ardabil until mid-July, where they took up a strictly honorary role under Fidarov. According to Mirza Firooz Khan (1912), the Shahsevan who defeated Rashid al-Mulk sent Samad Khan the following message: 'Do not send any more Mussulman soldiers against us. We do not care to kill our Mussulman brethren, but send all the Russians you can. We will settle our account with those yellow dogs ! ' Fidarov now had some 5,000 troops-Cossacks, infantry, and artillery-and began a campaign which lasted several months. The Persian authorities expressed their concern that he intended to annihilate the tribes, while the Russian newspapers played down the political nature of his expedition; the Shahsevan were not patriots defending their country against the invader, but lawless brigands who had proved a scourge both to the Russians and to their own countrymen, and were to be prevented from further banditry and to be forced to restore all the stolen goods.
The Shahsevan meanwhile were organizing themselves, having learnt the lesson of defeat from the Nationalist forces two years earlier. The two most powerful tribes, Hajjikhojalu and Qojabeglu, made up their differences and collected their warriors; they detailed some of the client tribes to declare themselves neutral and take all the flocks and families aside to a place of safety, leaving the warriors free to deal with the Russians, to whom they swore never to submit. The tribes were no longer interested in the Royalist cause, which had become discredited; and even those who still favoured it were annoyed with Samad Khan for not openly declaring for Muhammad 'All on occupying Tabriz. Indeed, the chiefs returned from Tehran seem to have had encouragement and finance from influential persons there, to keep Samad Khan busy in Azarbayjan and prevent him from marching on the capital in the ex-Shah's name.
Throughout July and August the Shahsevan and the Russians fought. The course of the campaign, and even its outcome, are hard to determine. The Russians declared their eventual complete success, but observers in Tabriz saw large numbers of casualties brought in, while the Shahsevan themselves maintain that their warriors killed thousands of Russians and that few tribesmen submitted.
Fidarov deployed his forces in four main columns, operating against Hajjikhojalu, Qojabeglu, Alarlu, and the Khalkhalis. Javat Khan Hajjikhojalu, with his Geyiklu allies, led the Russians first into the torrid wastes of Mughan in mid-July, and then back in August to Qosha Dagh; there, joined by a strong Party of Qojabeglu, he held the forest of Qashqamisheh against Fidarov's greatly superior force, which he is said eventually to have defeated and driven back to Mughan and across the frontier. Meanwhile over a thousand warriors from Qojabeglu and associated tribes broke through a cordon with which the Russians had tried to trap them in the north-east of the region, and headed south to Miyaneh, threatening the small Russian garrison in Qazvln and then asking government permission to migrate to Kurdistan or Turkey, to find winter quarters far from the Russians; they were eventually headed back north by a Persian force sent by Samad Khan. At Deman, the column sent against the Al5rlu suffered heavily and lost a number of guns to the tribesmen. In September, however, the Russians achieved at least partial success, for they captured Muhammad Quli Alarlu and executed him, and then captured Amir 'Ashayir Shatranlu, though he kept his life. They then cut off the nomads' retreat to Mughan. All those tribes which had submitted or been defeated, including those detailed by IHajjikhojalu and Qojabeglu to look after their property, were collected at the Samin bridge over the Qarasu near Ardabil, and the Russians proceeded, with official permission, to divide all the property into two and to confiscate one half of it-whether animals, arms, tents, or clothing. This event is remembered by the Shahsevan as ' the year of division ' (bolgi-yilf) and as the end of their struggle against the Tsarist Russians. The warriors of Qojabeglu, Geyiklu, and Hajjikhojalu are said to have remained unsubdued, but they retained none of their property but their horses, their rifles, and their women, which they would have died sooner than give up. In October Fidarov's army withdrew with its booty.25
From the end of 1912 until 1917 the Shahsevan continued to raid throughout the region, but caused no major trouble to the Russian forces which, apart from a brief evacuation in the winter of 1914-15, remained garrisoned at Ardabil. The tribesmen retained control of the region until 1923, when they were finally defeated and disarmed by the troops of the War Minister Riza Khan.
Raiding, reaction, and rivalry
In the nine hundred or so years of their presence in South West Asia, Turkic tribes have been notorious for their predatory activity, a cultural feature which may be seen as a fundamental principle of social organization. Noting that the Turkic ' tribe ' is a political and not an ethnic or descent group, Oberling has observed that:
Traditionally, the chief's job was to make war (i.e. to get booty), and protect his tribesmen from other tribes whose leaders were similarly inclined. As a rule, there was a direct correlation between the military prowess of a chief and the size of his following.26 However strong the sense of moral duty which successful dynasties such as the Safavids and Qajars managed to instil in their subordinate tribes, the allegiance of the chiefs could not be secured without supplementary material rewardsspoils; the chiefs too relied on a supply of spoils with which to ensure the support of their own tribal followings. In many ways, the tribal policy of the early Qajars resembled that of the early Safavids : though they imitated the Safavids in fostering the charismatic, almost sacred, public image of the Shah himself,27 they rewarded their most loyal followers with lucrative governorships, land grants, and tax concessions; they controlled the tribes through approved chiefs, to whom they gave authority, legitimacy, and responsibility; they were at first successful in their military campaigns, another source of spoils. The similarity soon ends, however, for while the Safavids, thanks largely to Shah 'Abbas I, enjoyed a heyday of a century and a half and were then allowed nearly another century of peaceful decline before suddenly succumbing to aggression by Afghans, Ottomans, and Russians, the Qajar dynasty was less than two decades old when it confronted irresistible aggression, though even then it was not allowed to fall, for the Imperial powers which could so easily have destroyed the dynasty co-operated in preserving it for another century. None the less, as In the years following the Russian withdrawal (1917) the Shahsevan devoted themselves politically to activity within the inter-tribal context, though they remained alert to threats and opportunities presented by external political forces. Of the Turks, the British, the Nationalists, the Democrats, and the Bolsheviks, none offered the combined values of Shah and Islam, so none received unequivocal support from the Shahsevan. When Riza Khan seized power, however, and set about gaining control of the country, he made sure at first to court the religious leaders and to rebuff charges against him of secular intentions, and when he sent his army to pacify the Shahsevan it was not so much by superior force or by an appeal for national security that he persuaded most of them to submit without a fight, but rather by advertising his support for both Islam and the reigning Shah, Sultan Ahmad Qajar. If the Shahsevan disapproved later when he abandoned these symbols by creating a new dynasty and a secular state, they could no longer resist, since they had been disarmed and subjected to the control of the new, secular National Army.
Thus, in most situations during the early twentieth century, it was not possible for the Shahsevan to act in a fashion at once consistent with both loyalty to Shah and fidelity to Islam; but where it was possible so to act, then they did so. It is important to establish this consistency, not only because it corrects the bad press image the Shahsevan have had but also because they claimed at the time to be primarily motivated by these values (Shah and Islam),30 while Shahsevan tribespeople in the 1960s found nothing shameful in the actions of their fathers and grandfathers a half-century earlier.
None the less, if the Shahsevan did not betray their professed ideals, their political attitudes and behaviour did also conform throughout the period with two other imperatives, namely, material gain and the prosecution of internal rivalries. Possibly the main factor influencing Shahsevan political attitudes at this period was relations between and within the tribes themselves. Over the previous century, as we have seen, the Shahsevan confederations of iMishkin and Ardabil had broken down and new patterns of inter-tribal relations had formed, based largely on territorial and economic factors. With the restriction and redistribution of winter pastures, hostility if not feud became the characteristic relationship between neighbouring tribes. The restriction of the pastoral economy also forced the tribes to expand their non-pastoral activities, especially agriculture (or control of it) and raiding. The administration, ever short of resources, not only encouraged raiding but at the same time abandoned attempts to control the tribes through the paramount chiefs, in favour of a policy of khankhanlikh, in effect divide et impera; a policy which, as its obvious result was not order and security but the enrichment (through bribes, fines, and taxes) of its officials, served only to diminish further the tribespeople's respect for the administration.31 The chiefs meanwhile acquired even greater power, measured by their wealth and their success in raiding, while rivalries developed within the major chiefly dynasties and split their tribal followings in consequence. The hostility of rivals within a tribe was sometimes more bitter than inter-tribal hostilities, and a tribe could not be counted on to unite against outsiders.32
The The main Shahsevan chiefs were certainly politically informed, aware, through advisers in their suites and contacts in the cities, of the course and implications of the events that were shaking Persia. Their actions were motivated not merely by short-term gain, but at least in part by consideration of the long-term relevance of national issues to their local interests. Probably they never assembled more than a few thousand horsemen for a campaign; usually bands of a few hundred at most confronted the Russian Cossacks or other hostile forces. Contemporary Russian and British agents considered them a formidable fighting body, as great a potential military threat to government as any other tribal group in the country; they could muster 10-12,000 horsemen in their own defence-but not more than half that number for a campaign outside their home territory. It is this factor-the comparative vulnerability and accessibility of Shahsevan pastures and property, both to Russian and to Persian government forces-rather than any comparative lack of leadership or political commitment, that explains why the Shahsevan never made any concerted effort, in whatever cause, to emulate the achievements of the Bakhtiari in Tehran. 33 In later years, before they were disarmed, the coalitions aligned into two blocs: the AlarluPolatlu-Shatranlu coalition joined that of Hajjikhojalu, Geyiklu and sometimes 'Isabeglu, against the alliance of Qojabeglu-Yortchi-Khimislu, which (until Amir Arshad's death) had common cause with Hajji'alilu; but allies in each bloc did not send each other material support. Chiefly families within each bloc would contract marriages with each other, but affinal ties were no guarantee of permanence in an alliance.
